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ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE FOG OF 
INNOVATION: A DEEP-DIVE ON GOVERNANCE AND THE 
LIABILITY OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS 
By Brandon W. Jackson † 
ABSTRACT 
The convergence of various technological advancements has 
caused numerous industries to pivot towards the development of 
artificial intelligence and machine learning. With promises to 
positively augment nearly all aspects of our daily lives, artificial 
intelligence and machine learning have the potential to change the very 
fabric of our society. To realize these benefits, or perhaps avoid the 
forecasted perils of artificial intelligence, society must overcome 
certain technological, legal, and social challenges. The complexity of 
these issues is compounded by the fact that AI does not exist in a 
vacuum, and it is intertwined with data rights, privacy rights, 
intellectual property protection, ethics, civil rights, due process, 
geopolitics, and social values, among other considerations. As with 
many areas of innovation, the technology rapidly outpaces the law. 
This paper seeks to further the discussion of governing artificial 
intelligence systems and the role of liability as an indirect form of 
regulation. It is premised on the likelihood that broad regulation of the 
underlying technologies is unlikely in the United States given the 
relevant infant state of artificial intelligence and the potential social 
and economic benefits offered by machine learning. This paper 
supports the contention that judicial decision-making will play a 
significant role in shaping the artificial intelligence landscape. It 
examines principles of agency and alternative legal identities as 
applied to artificial intelligence. Further, this paper explores problems 
associated with trying to apply common law principles of liability, such 
as product liability and strict liability, to autonomous systems. As these 
systems move towards greater autonomy, common law principles of 
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agency will become too attenuated and assigning liability will prove to 
be difficult under current liability rules. Thus, the courts will likely 
struggle to harmonize the nuances of innovation with traditional 
concepts of law. This paper argues that to capitalize on the benefits 
offered by artificial intelligence, or more importantly to avoid its 
destructive perils, it will be paramount for society and the law to 
evolve. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Alan Turing, in his famous 1950 paper, “Computing Machinery 
and Intelligence,” wrote, “we can only see a short distance ahead, but 
we can see plenty there that needs to be done.”1 This sentiment, 
expressed nearly 70 years ago in the context of whether machines can 
think, reflects the current momentum of recent technological 
breakthroughs to endow machines with the ability to make intelligent 
decisions — the  concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI). While the 
notion of AI is not novel, it has recently become a driving factor in 
industry because of compounded advancements in the availability of 
big data, machine learning approaches and algorithms, and powerful 
computing mechanisms.2 More importantly, these technological 
breakthroughs have provided tangible realizations of how AI can be 
infused into nearly all domains to address society’s greatest challenges. 
Even with these advancements, however, the exploration into AI is 
seated in infancy as society seeks to understand and overcome the 
technological, social, and legal challenges of computer systems 
endowed with human characteristics and abilities.  
Turing’s sentiments towards progress in AI are not unique to 
technological development; rather, they stand as a modern summation 
of the legal and social thinking that continues to be necessitated by 
society’s reach for a scientific way to augment the human experience. 
This paper is designed to further the discussion of AI governance and, 
specifically, the role of liability as an indirect form of regulation. Part 
I examines the technological foundation for AI, as well as the promises 
and perils it holds, as a precursor to understanding the encompassing 
issues of law and policy. Part II explores the technological, legal, and 
social barriers to AI governance, including how governing issues are 
compounded by the blended nature of AI with other technological 
domains, such as privacy, big data, and cybersecurity. In light of these 
challenges, it is likely that judicial decisions surrounding tort liability 
will be a driving force in shaping the AI landscape. Lastly, Part III 
analyzes the competencies of traditional liability regimes to remedy 
harms caused by AI systems. To an extent, the concept of strict liability 
is the most amenable tort regime that can be harmonized with emerging 
                                                          
1 A.M. Turing, Computing Machinery and Intelligence (1950), 
https://www.csee.umbc.edu/courses/471/papers/turing.pdf.  
2 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 6 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf. (discussing big data, improved machine learning 
approaches and algorithms, and more powerful computers as three factors that began driving 
progress and enthusiasm for AI around 2010). 
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AI technologies. However, as the technology pushes towards greater 
autonomy in effectuating action, legal principles of agency become too 
attenuated to be applicable and allocating costs for harm becomes more 
complex. Absent a new approach to law and policy, it is unlikely that 
current liability rules will be sufficient to satisfy the expectations of the 
judiciary and the public as the underlying technologies develop. 
Considering these challenges, it is likely that law and policy directed 
towards AI will require society to accept solutions that may support 
conflicting values but are beneficial to humanity overall. 
I. UNDERSTANDING AI, MACHINE LEARNING, AND THE ROLE 
OF ALGORITHMS 
A. AI, Machine Learning, and Algorithms: A Technical 
Foundation 
In recent years, AI has been thrust to the vanguard of technical 
development as nation states, private industries, and researchers seek 
to understand and exploit its potential.3 Despite its prominence in the 
global technological realm, there is no universally accepted definition 
for AI. In a broad sense, AI constitutes a computerized system that can 
rationally solve complex problems or act appropriately to achieve an 
objective.4 Some experts narrow the scope of AI based on taxonomies 
that reflect the function, capabilities, or problem space of the system.5 
For example, venture capitalist Frank Chen categorizes the problem 
space of AI into five general groups: logical reasoning, knowledge 
representation, planning and navigation, natural language processing, 
and perception.6 The difficulty in defining what actually constitutes AI 
stems from the expansive nature of the problems and solutions sought 
to be conquered through AI, and the underlying performance of 
algorithms that fuel AI development. Because the problems and 
                                                          
3 Louis Columbus, McKinsey’s State of Machine Learning and AI, 2017, FORBES (July 9, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/louiscolumbus/2017/07/09/mckinseys-state-of-machine-learning-
and-ai-2017/#220930e075b6. (“Tech giants including Baidu and Google spent between $20B to 
$30B on AI in 2016, with 90% of this spent on R&D and deployment, and 10% on AI 
acquisitions.”) 
4 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 6 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf. (“Others define AI as a system capable of rationally solving 
complex problems or taking appropriate actions to achieve its goal in whatever real-world 
circumstances it encounters.”) 
5 Id. (citing Stuart Russell and Peter Norvig, Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (3rd ed. 
Pearson, 2009)). 
6 Id. at 7 (citing Frank Chen, AI, Deep Learning, and Machine Learning: A Primer (June 10, 
2016), http://a16z.com/2016/06/10/ai-deep-learning-machines). 
2019] Artificial Intelligence  39 
solutions to be evaluated by AI flow naturally between routine data 
processing by algorithmic systems and AI machine learning that 
requires intelligent computer programs, it is common for a problem to 
be viewed as requiring AI to be solved, but consisting of routine data 
processing once answered.7 While the definition of AI may be fluid and 
inexact, at its core is the pursuit of AI applications that can systemically 
produce intelligent behavior.8  
Within the realm of AI and at the center of this technological 
transformation is machine learning that uses a statistical approach to 
apply algorithms and learn from data. While AI traditionally involves 
programming rules and criteria to reach a decision, machine learning 
uses algorithms to statistically evaluate large amounts of data to 
repeatedly refine its decision-making processes and outcomes. 
Machine learning is a subset of AI that involves methods to allow 
computers to think by “creating mathematical algorithms based on 
accumulated data.”9 Within machine learning is the concept of deep 
learning — using neural network models to mimic human thinking. In 
a sense, deep learning fuels machine learning to create artificial 
intelligence. Nidhi Chappel, Director of Machine Learning at Intel, 
described this as “machines learning on their own without explicit 
programming.”10 She compared this process to how a child observes 
the world and learns societal norms without being explicitly told the 
rules.11 
The inherent ambiguity and breadth of AI in an increasingly 
blended world of technological advancements and big data has pushed 
universal definitions of these concepts out of reach, at least for the time 
being. While precise definitions of these terms are beyond the scope of 
this paper, it is important to understand that substantively defining AI 
and its subsets is one of the major hurdles to achieving a practical 
regulatory context for AI. By defining the technology, the law will be 
better suited to articulate the problems posed by AI. This is, however, 
not surprising, as law almost always remains unsettled without 
concrete examples and practical applications. In this context, the 
                                                          
7 Id. at 7 (“In some cases, opinion may shift, meaning that a problem is considered as requiring 
AI before it has been solved, but once a solution is well known it is considered routing data 
processing.”). 
8 Id. (“Although the boundaries of AI can be uncertain and have tended to shift over time, what 
is important is that a core objective of AI research and applications over the years has been to 
automate or replicate intelligent behavior.”). 
9 Deb Miller Landau, Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning: How Computers Learn, IQ 
BY INTEL (August 17, 2016), https://iq.intel.com/artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/.  
10 Id. (quoting Nidhi Chappell). 
11 Id. 
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enthusiasm for investing in AI is great and certain tangible applications 
have already become pervasive in our daily lives. However, machine 
learning algorithms — which constitute the core of AI as a vehicle for 
societal change — remain in infancy, as society has only begun to 
recognize the potential of AI to transform industries. It is likely that 
reaching usable definitions of AI and its subcomponents will take time 
as the challenges to be addressed and the fruits of the technology are 
realized. In the interim, it is the obligation of technology experts, legal 
experts, and regulating entities to push through these obfuscated 
hurdles in pursuit of regulatory definitions that are necessary to shape 
the legal, social, and political aspects of AI.12 
B. Promises and Perils: The Next Step in Human Evolution? 
Machines that think like humans — a concept that stands as a 
technological gateway to what could be the next step in human 
evolution. From autonomous driving vehicles to improving genomic 
sequencing, AI has just begun to demonstrate its utility in tackling 
some of the greatest challenges faced by society. On a more intimate 
level, applications like speech recognition AI platforms are becoming 
increasingly pervasive in our day-to-day lives. These commercial-
oriented forms that have specific applications, known as Narrow AI, 
are becoming an extension of how humans interact with technology to 
accomplish defined tasks.13 In a broader sense, General AI — a 
notional future AI system that has the intelligent behavior to process 
cognitive tasks — is believed to be the future of intelligent systems.14 
While Narrow AI allows technology to perform specific tasks beyond 
what a human can do, General AI has the potential to surpass human 
performance in almost every cognitive task.15 The capability of AI 
                                                          
12 Defining AI and its subsets is challenging given the technological uncertainties, social 
considerations, and geopolitical factors that are inherent to a technology with the potential to 
change how the world operates. In this context, it is likely that defining these terms will take time 
and will likely require different definitions depending on the context in which the technology is 
being used.  
13 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 6 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“Remarkable progress has been made on what is known as 
Narrow AI, which addresses specific application areas such as playing strategic games, language 
translation, self-driving vehicles, and image recognition.”). 
14 Id. (“General AI (sometimes called Artificial General Intelligence or AGI) refers to a notional 
future AI system that exhibits apparently intelligent behavior at least as advanced as a person 
across the full range of cognitive tasks.”) 
15 Max Tegmark, Benefits & Risks of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE, 
https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-artificial-intelligence/ (“While narrow AI 
may outperform humans at whatever its specific task is, like playing chess or solving equations, 
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systems to evaluate large amounts of complex, and sometimes 
unrelated, data has the potential to solve some of the world’s most 
enduring problems, leading to enormous social and economic 
benefits.16 According to the Center for Data Innovation, AI is already 
having a positive social and economic impact.17 The report issued by 
the Center for Data Innovation highlighted 70 real-world examples of 
the social and economic benefits in 14 different areas. The Center’s 
director believes that this list has only scratched the surface of AI’s 
social and economic value.  
Despite its promises, there are, like most technological 
innovations, foreseeable and speculative perils. In the short-term, AI 
has the potential to disrupt job markets across the world. From factory 
workers to lawyers, AI could replace the need for humans to perform 
specific tasks. However, the social impact of AI is a matter of debate. 
While AI may replace humans in specific jobs, many experts believe 
that it has the potential to create more jobs as technology spurs new 
industries.18 From a long-term perspective, AI has sparked concern that 
it could be a destructive force by either being programmed to do 
something devastating or to do something beneficial, but with 
destructive force.19 The discussion of the practical and theoretical 
benefits of AI is one that will, and should, continue during the course 
of the technology’s development. However, from a legal context, there 
are narrower perils that could have a significant impact on society.  
                                                          
AGI would outperform humans at nearly every cognitive task.”). 
16 Francesca Rossi, European Parliament Legal Affairs Briefing, Artificial Intelligence: 
Potential Benefits and Ethical Considerations 1, 1 (October 2016),  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/571380/IPOL_BRI%282016%2957
1380_EN.pdf. (“The ability of AI systems to transform vast amounts of complex, ambiguous 
information into insight has the potential to reveal long-held secrets and help solve some of the 
world’s most enduring problems.”). 
17 Daniel Castro and Joshua New, The Promise of Artificial Intelligence 1, 2 (October 2016), 
http://www2.datainnovation.org/2016-promise-of-ai.pdf, (citing Olivia Solon, Karim the AI 
Delivers Psychological Support to Syrian Refugees, THE GUARDIAN (March 22, 2016), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technol- ogy/2016/mar/22/karim-the-ai-delivers-psychological-
support-to-syrian-refugees; Dina Bass, Microsoft Develops AI to Help Cancer Doctors Find the 
Right Treatments, BLOOMBERG, (September 20, 2016), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-20/microsoft-develops-ai-to-help-cancer-
doctors- nd- the-right-treatments).  
18 See generally Douglas Eldridge, Why the Benefits of Artificial Intelligence Outweigh the Risks, 
SMS WIRE (February 22, 2017), https://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/why-the-benefits-
of-artificial-intelligence-outweigh-the-risks/. 
19Max Tegmark, Benefits & Risks of Artificial Intelligence, FUTURE OF LIFE INSTITUTE, 
https://futureoflife.org/background/benefits-risks-of-artificial-intelligence/ (“when considering 
how AI might become a risk, experts think two scenarios most likely: 1. The AI is programmed 
to do something devastating, or 2. the AI is programmed to do something beneficial, but it 
develops a destructive method for achieving its goal.”). 
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Inherent in AI and machine learning systems is the aspect that the 
technology’s development includes some level of programming and 
emulation of principles used by human experts. This injects a 
subjective human element into what is supposed to be an objective and 
unbiased process that relies on data and mathematical algorithms. But 
if the data or algorithm is tainted with some level of bias, then how 
much faith do we have in the AI system? Does an AI system merely 
create a false expectancy of fairness? No system is perfect, and perhaps 
these systems, even with a certain level of algorithmic prejudice, are 
better suited to perform a task in a manner more objective than that of 
humans. It is likely that the answer to these questions lie with each 
specific technological use and application. The subjective bias of 
humans typically cannot be measured and sometimes eludes our own 
conscious. It is quite conceivable that even with some level of fallacy, 
AI stands to provide for greater fairness in most decision-making 
processes. From criminal sentencing to acceptance at an educational 
institute, AI has the potential to imperfectly perfect human decision-
making. But for society to accept the idea that a machine can be fairer 
than a human requires certain levels of transparency, accountability, 
and understandability must be accounted for in the technological 
process that results in a machine that can learn, think, and act in 
society’s best interest.  
C. The Regulatory Landscape 
1. The United States 
In the United States, public and private sectors have placed a 
heavy focus on the development of AI and machine learning systems. 
Taking into consideration the short and long-term benefits and 
concerns of AI, the United States has assessed that the benefits of AI 
are vast, and the development of AI is critical to the country’s 
economic and social vitality.20 As such, the United States has devoted 
significant resources to developing AI and seeks to be at the forefront 
of AI research.21 From a regulatory perspective, the United States has 
assessed that any broad regulation of AI is inappropriate in the current 
stage of AI and machine learning. As with other technologies that have 
                                                          
20 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 5 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“The current and projected benefits of AI technology are 
large, adding to the Nation’s economic vitality and to the productivity and well-being of its 
people.”). 
21 Id. (“The United States has been at the forefront of foundational research in AI.”). 
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the potential to significantly impact the global socioeconomic platform, 
regulation in the early stages of development has the potential to hinder 
progress in the field. Russian President Vladimir Putin echoed the 
importance of AI when he stated, “whoever becomes the leader in [AI] 
will become the ruler of the world.”22 This statement reflects what has 
been called the new global arms race for superpowers.23 Thus, it is clear 
why the United States is not ready to insert a broad regulatory 
framework into the AI arena. However, this reluctance is not solely 
based on efforts to win the AI development race, and it does not 
necessarily mean that the United States is averse to tailored regulation 
in the future. 
The applicability of AI is expansive and already touches on 
multiple industries that are regulated to protect the public and promote 
fair competition. The approach of the United States towards regulating 
AI is based on an informed assessment that accounts for the benefits of 
the technology, the associated risks to public safety, and potential 
barriers to innovation.24 Under this approach, when the risk of an AI-
enabled product falls within the realm of an existing regulatory regime, 
it should be considered whether current regulations already consider 
the risks in a sufficient manner. If the protections in place are 
inadequate, existing regulations should be modified and expanded to 
provide the necessary safeguards while accounting for AI innovation 
and growth. For example, fully autonomous vehicles are at our 
doorstep. Rather than seeking to regulate the underlying AI technology, 
the states and the Federal government are looking to broaden motor 
vehicle regulations to account for self-driving vehicles. In doing so, the 
government attempts to minimize barriers to innovation while 
maintaining its obligation to protect the public. 
While the United States government seems to be content to refrain 
from broadly regulating AI and machine learning for the time being, 
there is significant debate in the technology industry as to whether this 
is the right decision. The more alarmist and extreme approach, echoed 
by technology entrepreneur Elon Musk, urges for government 
regulation in this field because he believes AI poses an existential 
                                                          
22 See Tom Simonite, For Superpowers, Artificial Intelligences Fuels New Global Arms Race, 
WIRED (September 8, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/for-superpowers-artificial-
intelligence-fuels-new-global-arms-race/. 
23 See generally id.  
24 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 17 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“In doing so, agencies must remain mindful of the 
fundamental purpose and goals of regulation to safeguard the public good, while creating space 
for innovation and growth in AI.”). 
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threat to human civilization.25 However, the United States government 
believes that even if the more science-fiction threat of AI is true, it does 
not change how the problem should be addressed today. Essentially, 
even if AI poses a long-term threat of super-intelligent machines 
capable of surpassing humanity’s control, it does not change how the 
technology should be pushed forward today. The National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC) Committee on Technology has 
determined that the best way to build the capacity to address these long-
term speculations is to tackle the short-term and less extreme security, 
privacy, and safety risks of AI.26 
2. The European Union and the Right to an 
Explanation 
Beyond the United States, other democratic nations have taken a 
more substantive approach to regulating AI. In particular, the European 
Union passed the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which 
seeks to, in part, harmonize data privacy laws across Europe. The 
regulation includes non-discrimination requirements for algorithmic 
profiling and a right to obtain an explanation of automated decisions 
that significantly affect users.27 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman 
have suggested that this could require “a complete overhaul of 
standards and widely used algorithmic techniques,” and reflects how 
important human interpretability is to algorithmic design.28  
While some argue that this regulation is a harmful restriction of 
AI,29 Goodman and Flaxman contended that it simply creates an 
                                                          
25 See generally Brett Molina, Musk: Government needs to regulate artificial intelligence (July 
17, 2017), USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/07/17/musk-
government-needs-regulate-artificial-intelligence/484318001/ 
26 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 8 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“The NSTC Committee on Technology’s assessment is that 
long-term concerns about super-intelligent General AI should have little impact on current policy. 
The policies the Federal Government should adopt in the near-to-medium term if these fears are 
justified are almost exactly the same policies the Federal Government should adopt if they are not 
justified.”). 
27 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 
Recital 71, arts. 13-14, 22, 2016 O.J. L 119/1 [hereinafter GDPR]. 
28 Bryce Goodman and Seth Flaxman, European Union regulations on algorithmic decision-
making and a “right to explanation” 1, 1 (August 31, 2016), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1606.08813.pdf. 
29 See generally Nick Wallace, EU’s Right to Explanation: A Harmful Restriction on Artificial 
Intelligence (January 25, 2017), 
http://www.techzone360.com/topics/techzone/articles/2017/01/25/429101-eus-right-
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opportunity to ensure transparency and fairness in algorithmic design. 
The United States has not taken significant regulatory steps towards 
algorithmic accountability, but it has acknowledged the importance of 
transparency and fairness in the development of AI.30 There is a fine 
line between regulatory actions that will infuse AI and algorithmic 
machine learning with democratic values of fairness, and those that will 
create barriers to innovation. At the very least, regulatory efforts to 
promote transparency and accountability in AI should be explored as 
the fruits of the technology and the underlying problems posed by 
innovation continue to develop. The inclusion of these concepts is not 
only paramount to ensuring justice in a technology that stands to be 
broadly implemented across industries but may also be critical to social 
acceptance of AI and algorithmic machine learning applications.  
II.  NAVIGATING THE FOG OF INNOVATION: THE 
TECHNOLOGICAL, LEGAL, AND SOCIAL HURDLES TO 
GOVERNING AI 
Beyond the technological hurdles to mastering AI are legal and 
social challenges. The complexity of these issues is compounded by 
the fact that AI does not exist in a vacuum. The development and 
implementation of AI and machine learning is intertwined with data 
rights, privacy rights, intellectual property protection, ethics, civil 
rights, due process, geopolitics, and social values, among other 
considerations. At the core of these issues are the transparency, 
accountability, and understandability of AI in the judicial system. To 
ensure fairness and safety, it is expected that AI systems be free of 
unjustified discrimination and unintended consequences. To promote 
confidence in these systems, it is necessary that evidentiary 
mechanisms exist to demonstrate the lack of unintended 
consequences.31 Taken a step further, the social acceptance of AI 
technologies is partially dependent on the existence of legal means to 
remedy unintended consequences. Part A of this section explores the 
legal goals and social expectations for a fully integrated AI society, and 
Part B addresses the problems that stand in the way of reaching these 
goals and realizing these expectations. Finally, in Part C of this section, 
                                                          
explanation-harmful-restriction-artificial-intelligence.htm# 
30 Executive Office of the President National Science and Technology Council Committee on 
Technology, Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence at 30 (October 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC
/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf (“The use of AI to make consequential decisions about 
people, often replacing decisions made by human actors and institutions, leads to concerns about 
how to ensure justice, fairness, and accountability.”). 
31 See generally id. at 30. 
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the function of judicial decision-making is explored with an emphasis 
on the significant role that liability litigation is likely to play in shaping 
the AI landscape.  
A. The Discovery of Goals and Expectations: From Legally 
Simple to Socially Complex 
Recent triumphs in AI development have sparked an awakening 
of the potential utility of AI. Certain AI systems and machine-learned 
processes have already entered the daily lives of almost all individuals. 
From the use of AI autopilot systems in commercial flights to the use 
of AI for facial recognition on social media sites, certain autonomous 
machine intelligence processes have quietly become a societal norm.32  
While society has yet to experience the scaled infusion of AI into all 
sectors of our industry, an automated economy fueled by AI may soon 
be at our doorstep.33 Across domains, technology continues to provide 
the seed for imagining new, tangible applications of AI. With each 
formation of a practical application, society begins to forecast the legal 
and social considerations of its use and is often faced with 
contradictory positions. Although these deliberations are typically 
driven by economics, questions of legal consequences and social 
expectations underpin any discussion. When considering the scaled 
application of AI across society, it is necessary to broadly understand 
the goals of the law and expectations of society.  
From a legal perspective, the goals of governing AI are simple — 
reduce uncertainty and protect consumers without inhibiting 
innovation. While these concepts are straightforward in idea, they are 
far from simple in application. From the likelihood of harming the 
public to providing predictable measures of liability, uncertainty in the 
law can take many forms. In general, AI governance should be 
highlighted by some form of validation and verification — making sure 
an AI system or process does what it is designed to do and providing a 
mechanism of confirmation to an extent generally accepted by society. 
However, as discussed later in this paper, while scholars can articulate 
where the law needs to be in terms of governance, getting there 
involves complex legal and policy questions. More importantly, there 
is a cyclical effect in how social expectations drive legal goals and vice-
versa. Put simply, social expectations influence how society seeks to 
                                                          
32 See generally Gautam Narula, Everyday Examples of Artificial Intelligence and Machine 
Learning (February 14, 2017), https://www.techemergence.com/everyday-examples-of-ai/. 
33 See generally Kevin Maney, How Artificial Intelligence and Robots Will Radically Transform 
the Economy, NEWSWEEK (November 30, 2016), http://www.newsweek.com/2016/12/09/robot-
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govern AI, but are in-turn influenced by the legal mechanisms in place 
to account for the unexpected and unjust outcomes that sit on the 
fringes of technical application.  
While policymakers and scholars can speak generally of the broad 
and lofty legal goals for governing AI, the narrow legal objectives and 
social expectations are more challenging. Each application of AI does 
not exist in a vacuum and may be heavily dependent on existential 
influences — privacy, big data, or security concerns, among others. 
Society may be willing to accept a specific AI technology, such as self-
driving cars, when the benefits to society clearly outweigh the risk of 
potential harm. However, how does this change when AI is being 
implemented on a large scale across society? How much deferment to 
artificial systems is too much, and how does this change as AI becomes 
scalable on an intimate level? Are we willing to accept artificial 
intelligence that can drive us to a hospital or even provide a diagnosis, 
but not a system that decides whether we are eligible for care? In this 
domain, like many that are at the forefront of innovation, the only 
certainty is uncertainty. Society may not yet be able to define social 
expectations for AI. The only guarantee is that large-scale disruption is 
likely on the horizon, and policymakers will have to consider the legal 
and social consequences of this transformation.  
The social and economic benefits of AI and machine learning 
processes only go as far as society perceives that the technology is 
fulfilling its purpose without unjustified bias, prejudice, or harm. As 
such, the success of this technology is premised on the idea that an AI 
system must perform its function in a just and fair manner with a 
minimal and publicly acceptable deviation from absolute expectations. 
Given the prevalence that algorithms and AI are expected to have in 
our daily lives, there are certain democratic principles of due process 
that should be incorporated into algorithmic development to account 
for a remedy in the instance of harm by an AI system — transparency, 
accountability, and understandability.34 However, achieving sufficient 
levels of justice and fairness in due process is subjective and dependent 
on the area in which AI is being applied. Society should not expect the 
same levels of justice and fairness in all domains. Assuring 
transparency, accountability, and understandability is not an absolute 
when it comes to AI, it is a spectrum.  
How this spectrum is defined moves beyond a legal issue and 
requires an understanding of social sensibilities as they relate to AI. 
Despite efforts to perfect an algorithm, the possibility of unintended 
                                                          
34 See generally Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for 
Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2014). 
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consequences exist. When AI is used to decide in place of human 
judgment or to supplement a human decision-making process that has 
significant consequences, what levels of fairness and accountability are 
expected to ensure justice? Generally, the level of expected due process 
is directly proportional to the contiguity of an algorithm to a more 
fundamental right or critical decision. Put another way, as an algorithm 
becomes more significant to a decision that by nature requires a higher 
degree of legal protection, there is a greater need for algorithmic due 
process. While this may be simple in theory, the complexity of this 
paradigm makes AI governance an elusive task as the very nature of 
trying to define the expectations, consequences, and remedies for AI-
based harms can easily create multiple and conflicting legal and social 
positions. Moving forward, the ability of society and the law to 
conceive mechanisms of accountability for these conflicting values to 
coexist may define the pace of AI’s immersion into humanity. 
B. Legal and Social Hurdles to Governing AI Systems 
Rapid innovation across various technological domains has 
compounded the problem of technology outpacing the law. As 
technology builds on technology, governing mechanisms that are still 
trying to understand and account for previous innovations struggle to 
incorporate additional regulatory, ethical, and privacy considerations 
brought about by “the next big thing.” AI and machine learning are no 
exception. From the Internet to cybersecurity to big data to the Internet 
of Things (IoT), and now AI, intrinsic to each realm are unresolved 
considerations surrounding data rights, privacy rights, intellectual 
property, ethics, due process, social values, and geopolitical concerns. 
Trying to govern a single technological domain has proven to be 
difficult enough, yet alone blended worlds of overlapping technologies 
that complicate regulatory structures at all levels. From local to 
international governing bodies, the law is lost in the fog of innovation. 
Meanwhile, societal acceptance and social mores struggle to harmonize 
the complexity of these technologies that alter the human experience.  
The underlying problem of governing AI and related technologies 
is highlighted by the legal and social trade-offs that have so far eluded 
regulators. For example, restrictions on big data and privacy can 
significantly hinder AI systems that rely on available data to perfect 
their machine-learned processes. Whether it is the “going dark”35 
                                                          
35 See generally, James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Going Dark: Are 
Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course? (October 16, 2014), remarks 
delivered at the Brookings Institution, available at https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/going-
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problem or controversy surrounding section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA),36 society struggles to strike a 
balance between privacy and national security.37 Moreover, opposing 
sides tend to take absolute positions that obscure the issue at hand and 
exacerbate the problem of finding new legal approaches to emerging 
technologies.38 For AI, it often seems that the public puts a premium 
on privacy, while still expecting the benefits of AI systems where the 
commercial utility is derived from surpluses of consumer data.39  
Governments at all levels, from local legislators to international 
regulators, are experiencing the challenge of broadly governing AI 
technologies.40 Legislative bodies continue to wrestle with regulating 
intricate new systems that are rapidly changing and being scaled across 
industries and society. Uncertainty as to how AI systems will interact 
with the other complex systems and the economic impact this may have 
on the development of AI and machine learning systems complicates 
the question of how to regulate AI. Some existing domains, such as the 
automobile industry, have more easily embraced some forms of AI 
regulation.41 This is perhaps because of the impending transformation 
of the automobile industry that can no longer be ignored.42 It is also 
likely in part because a federal governing body, the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), already exists to harmonize 
new technologies with existing laws.  
In other areas, however, there is greater concern as to whether 
existence of any regulation of AI systems would stifle innovation. For 
example, it is possible that the accuracy and performance of AI systems 
                                                          
36 See generally Sneha Indrajit et al., FISA’s Section 702 & the Privacy Conundrum: Surveillance 
in the U.S. and Globally (October 25, 2017), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/controversy-
comparisons-data-collection-fisas-section-702/. 
37 See generally April F. Doss, Why Changes in Data Science Are Driving a Need For Quantum 
Law and Policy, and How We Get There, 14 ABA SCITECH LAWYER 38, 40 (Fall 2017). 
38 See id. (discussing how black-and-white views related to national security and privacy obscure 
the complexity of issues faced by society).  
39 See id. at 41 (discussing consumer demands for privacy). 
40 See generally Bianca Datta, Can Government Keep Up with Artificial Intelligence? (August 
10, 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/tech/ai-government-policy/. 
41 Gabrielle Orum Hernández, Interstate Regulatory Alignment: Keys to The Self-Driving Car? 
(November 2, 2017), 
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/sites/legaltechnews/2017/11/02/interstate-regulatory-
alignment-keys-to-the-self-driving-car/ (“Despite most regulatory action at the state level, 62 
percent of those polled sought nationally consistent rules from the U.S. Department of 
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42 Aarian Marshall, Congress Finally Gets Serious About Regulating Self-Driving Cars, WIRED 
(July 19, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/congress-autonomous-self-driving-car-
regulations/ (discussing how emerging technologies in self-driving vehicles is causing parties 
ranging from tech companies to government watchdogs to agree that the time has come for 
Congress to regulate autonomous vehicles). 
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would be jeopardized if engineers were required to prematurely or 
unnecessarily incorporate functional mechanisms during the 
developmental process to ensure principles of algorithmic due process 
— transparency, accountability, and understandability.43 In contrast, as 
more trust is placed in AI systems, the lack of these fundamental 
principles or poor regulatory mechanisms threatens to undermine any 
benefits offered by AI and machine learning technologies.44 Any 
regulatory miscalculation runs the potential of stifling the 
transformation of industries that are increasingly betting the future on 
AI technologies.45 It is not to say that some form of regulation should 
not be the ultimate goal or that it is even unlikely. Under the Obama 
administration, the United States began the conversation about the 
future of AI regulation.46 However, there is no indication that the 
United States intends to significantly and broadly regulate AI systems 
anytime soon.  
An alternative to direct regulation of AI systems is the creation of 
a centralized agency or commission for AI technologies. This would, 
at the least, allow expertise to be vested to agencies or commissions 
that can act more quickly than Congress and keep pace with emerging 
technologies. Any such body would likely be responsible for 
identifying principles to govern the development and application of AI, 
as well as enforcing any promulgated standards. In the United 
Kingdom, calls for an AI commission have been greater than in the 
United States.47 However, domestically, the application of AI has yet 
to warrant the creation of a government entity focused on AI.48 Rather, 
                                                          
43 Finale Doshi-Velez et al., Accountability of AU Under the Law: The Role of Explanation 
(November 3, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.01134.pdf (“there exist concerns that the 
engineering challenges surrounding explanation from AI systems would stifle innovation; that 
explanations might force trade secrets to be revealed; and that explanation would come at the 
price of system accuracy or other performance objective.”). 
44 Id.  
45 Manuel Goncalves, U.S. Auto CEOS More Bullish on AI, Emerging Technology Investments 
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46 See generally Ajay Agrawal et al., The Obama Administration’s Roadmap for AI Policy 
(December 21, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/12/the-obama-administrations-roadmap-for-ai-policy. 
47 See generally Joel Muckett, CBI calls for government AI commission (October 20, 2017), 
http://economia.icaew.com/en/news/october-2017/cbi-calls-for-ai-commission. 
48 Although the United States has not created an agency or commission devoted to AI, it has 
created the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Machine Learning and 
Artificial Intelligence (MLAT). The charter is available at  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/ai_charter_-
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independent federal agencies have begun to assume the challenge of 
regulating AI in their respective domains. For example, the United 
States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has assembled a team to 
oversee the use of AI in diagnosing medical conditions.49 Similarly, the 
NHTSA has published voluntary guidelines for driverless cars.50 The 
lack of federal legislation in the United States and the use of voluntary 
guidelines by respective agencies may certainly be a sign that the 
government is relying on private industry and market demands for safe 
products to drive the development of AI systems.  
Even if Congress sought to govern AI through legislation, it is 
questionable as to whether this is even a task suited for the legislative 
branch. The tedious and reactionary nature of the legislative process is 
not matched to keep pace with emerging technologies. Some scholars, 
such as April F. Doss, argue that our current governing system is 
insufficient to address the complexity of emerging technologies, and 
that it is paramount for law and policy mechanisms to evolve to keep 
pace.51 While the field is certainly ripe for change, a viable regulatory 
solution for AI systems and their overlapping technologies continues 
to elude policymakers and technology experts. In contrast to broad 
regulation, the more likely approach has been to pursue guidelines and 
standards that are more flexible and favorable to business investments 
in AI.  
Initiatives in the private industry have emerged, such as those by 
IBM52 and nonprofits like AI Global and the Future of Life Institute.53 
Similarly, organizations like the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers have begun to pursue standards in AI and robotics.54 These 
standards are not limited to the technical exploration of AI, but include 
the ethical and moral concerns of AI developers and users. As AI 
progresses to the point where regulatory standards can be developed, it 
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is likely that these standards will be derived from best practices 
promulgated in a manner similar to the National Institute of Science 
and Technology’s (NIST) cybersecurity guidelines.55 In the absence of 
any regulation of AI on the horizon, set standards would likely have a 
significant impact on the AI landscape in the United States. Through 
standardized approaches to developing and testing AI systems, the 
United States is moving to an industry and liability approach to 
governing AI that has the potential to vest the judicial system with 
significant influence in shaping the future of AI. 
C.   Judicial Decision-Making as a Driving Force in 
Governance  
AI and the technological domains it touches have proven to be 
problematic for direct regulation. From data privacy to cybersecurity, 
regulation has been a fragmented process that eludes traditional 
vehicles of law and policy. Absent unequivocal regulation, 
transforming industries seeking to capitalize on the benefits of AI have 
begun to look towards an industry-driven approach where guidelines 
and best practices provide some level of security to direct investment. 
Arguably, this approach will provide greater adaptability and flexibility 
than direct legislation in keeping pace with emerging and rapidly 
developing technologies. It is not to say that this approach is ideal. The 
business interests of private industry may not be aligned with those of 
society as a whole and may even contradict public safety concerns. As 
the sentiments of Ms. Doss were previously conveyed, increasingly 
complex issues in technology, privacy, and security foster a need for a 
new approach in law and policy to counter the uncertainty of emerging 
technologies.56 However, until a new way of thinking takes hold, 
standards, guidelines, and best practices are likely to rule the AI world, 
and judicial decision-making will follow right behind.  
Assigning and quantifying liability for actions taken or influenced 
by AI systems will play a significant role in the maturation of the AI 
landscape. With the development of standards and best practices in AI 
development, testing, and application, AI will fall into the purview of 
the court system through tort liability. While the intricacies of liability 
in a world of AI are uncertain and stand in the early stages of 
exploration, as discussed in Section III, standardized approaches to AI 
and machine learning systems will require the courts to weigh in. On a 
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case-by-case basis, the judicial system will slowly serve as an indirect 
form of regulation through the development of legal standards, 
precedence, and subsequent deterrence. However, there are inherent 
fallacies that cast doubt on the effectiveness of using the judicial 
system to indirectly regulate AI. 
A serious weakness within the judicial system is the lack of 
technological expertise. Few judges and lawyers have sufficient 
technological training to fully understand and judicially account for 
complex technologies that have already been brought before the courts. 
Several legal scholars have proffered that it is incumbent on the legal 
community to teach certain aspects in law school to help prepare legal 
enterprises to tackle the issues that lie ahead.57 However, this long-term 
solution does not provide immediate relief for the technological storm 
at the shores of the judiciary system. As Chief Justice Roberts 
suggested, “[judges] haven’t yet really absorbed how [AI] is going to 
change the way we do business.”58 Another significant limit of the 
judiciary is the remedial nature of courts. Courts are designed to correct 
or compensate for harm that has already occurred. Although legal 
precedence will certainly have a deterring effect, the process of 
establishing legal norms may have difficulty keeping up with the 
accelerated pace of AI development given the lengthy litigation process 
that is common in legal cases surrounding complex technologies.59 A 
final drawback of the judiciary system to indirectly govern AI is the 
court’s narrow focus.60 Judicial exploration is typically limited to 
specific facts relevant to the harm and risk involved and does not 
typically account for broader considerations surrounding the social and 
economic benefits of emerging technologies.61 
 Despite the limitations of judicial decision-making to influence 
the governance of AI, there are strengths in the judiciary that make it 
suited to be a driving force in governing emerging technologies. 
Although the judicial system may lack technical knowledge, courts 
have significant expertise in allocating responsibility. In the world of 
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AI and autonomy, there can be numerous entities involved in the 
development and implementation of an AI product that results in harm, 
and the courts are perhaps best equipped to allocate responsibility 
across an enterprise of defendants.62 Further, when uncertainty is high, 
the legal fact-finding processes of the tort system can be a dominant 
force in developing specific and relevant information when causation 
is in question.63 While at times the litigation process may be tedious 
and adversarial to the detriment of the public as a whole, it does provide 
for a natural, albeit slow, development of the law where workable 
solutions are promulgated across jurisdictions and harmful laws are 
rejected or modified.64  
These benefits demonstrate that deferring to judicial decision-
making to indirectly govern AI systems and emerging technologies is 
not completely the result of a lack of a better alternative. Rather, it is a 
reflection of a fragmented legal and policy process that struggles to 
absorb complex and esoteric technologies scaled across industries and 
society. AI may be at the world’s doorstep, but full autonomy in these 
technologies has not yet warranted rash action to curb systems that may 
prove to have significant benefits to society. While the capacity of AI 
as a tool for humanity seems to become more transparent day by day, 
legal and social regimes can only speculate as to the latent benefits to 
society that fully autonomous systems may hold. It is, therefore, quite 
possible that the ability of current liability regimes to address the 
questions posed by current AI technologies -- those that are more useful 
than revolutionary -- may pave the way for how society manages fully 
autonomous and truly intelligent AI that may be yet to come. 
III.  TRADITIONAL LIABILITY REGIMES AND AI SYSTEMS 
As the spectrum of intelligent machines, from General AI to fully 
autonomous and intelligence systems capable of independent learning, 
continues to evolve, the judiciary will be required to confront 
increasingly complex issues of liability. Litigation surrounding harms 
caused by automated machines and AI systems has already entered the 
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courts purview.65 However, as the underlying technologies push 
towards greater autonomy, the limits of common law tort regimes will 
be tested as the application of new technologies to traditional theories 
of liability becomes increasingly convoluted. How well the judiciary 
responds and applies current legal frameworks to effectively remedy 
harms is likely to play a significant role in the future of AI governance 
as the technology pushes towards greater autonomy. This section 
explores the application of liability claims involving AI systems to 
common law tort regimes.  
Part A introduces the relevance of legal identity as it relates to AI 
technologies by examining how the legal identity of an AI system plays 
a significant role in the application of common law tort claims. Part A 
also explores the idea that as AI systems assume more autonomy, 
traditional liability claims will be more strained in addressing 
respective harms. In Part B, current legal frameworks of liability are 
assessed as applied to harm caused by AI systems. Finally, Part C 
suggests that there is no common solution to the liability problem of 
AI systems, and that the law will likely require a blended approach to 
address the legal challenges on the horizon. The ability of current law 
and policy regimes will not be able to solve, but only manage, the novel 
legal issues that arise as technology pushes the envelope of autonomy 
and machine intelligence. Eventually, the scientific advancements that 
seek to enhance the human experience will likely require an evolution 
of law and policy.  
A. Identifying the Defendant: Principal-Agent vs. Alternate 
Legal Identities 
How an AI system is perceived and the legal status it is afforded 
is fundamental to resolving issues of liability for harms caused by 
autonomous systems. When the mark of human contribution is 
apparent in the decision of an autonomous system, common law 
principles of liability may be sufficient to find fault.66 In instances of 
an identifiable defect in an AI system, product or manufacturer liability 
may vest responsibility for the harm to the developers or those involved 
in the production chain of an AI system. Furthermore, under the 
principal-agent concept, an AI system could be considered an agent of 
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a manufacturer or other entity that, in some form or another, directs or 
is responsible for the harm caused. In this instance, when the law can 
point to some discernible level of human involvement, common law 
tort regimes may be suited to remedy a situation. However, as 
discussed in Part B of this section, the applicability of traditional 
liability regimes to AI is not clear and may likely be deficient to 
adequately protect the public when complex technologies are involved.  
As AI systems move towards greater autonomy, existing liability 
rules are likely to become insufficient for assigning fault for harms 
caused by AI technologies. A fully independent autonomous machine 
— one that is so far removed from human control that it acts based on 
its own analysis and without direct human input — certainly brings into 
question the principal-agent concept. In this instance, does such human 
deferment to a machine break any connection to the manufacturer or 
creators of the underlying algorithms to the extent that a machine could 
no longer be viewed as an agent of a principal? If so, to whom, or what, 
should fault be accorded? Perhaps a failure to introduce appropriate 
data in the machine learning process or failing to reasonably forecast a 
potential outcome could pivot the spotlight of responsibility to an entity 
in the production chain. But what about when fault is unclear, cannot 
be determined, or is the result of an unforeseen harm? Does the concept 
of res ipsa loquitur apply? These questions reflect the anticipated strain 
that AI is expected to place on common law principles of liability.   
Alternatives to making liability determinations based on the 
agency of an AI system have been offered and revolve around different 
concepts of legal identity. Over twenty-five years ago, Lawrence 
Solum explored the idea of whether AI could become a legal person.67 
At the time, Solum believed this inquiry was only theoretical because 
the technology to justify judicial review of the matter was lacking.68 
However, the recent emergence of more autonomous AI systems has 
shown that the time for this judicial inquiry may soon be here. While 
the notion of treating AI as a person may seem unnatural, the concept 
of juridical persons that are recognized in law as having duties and 
rights of those of natural persons shows that the idea of endowing 
machines with the legal status of a person is not so far-fetched.69 After 
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all, this bestowment has already occurred in numerous instances for 
corporations.70  
The idea of some form of corporate personhood for individual AI 
systems could make these technologies civilly or criminally liable for 
their actions. However, under current thinking, even if such a status 
was granted in the eyes of the law, “robots cannot be sued.”71 
Furthermore, in the instance of a liable robot defendant, compensation 
would still be required at a corporate level. While this would likely 
occur in some form of insurance either individually or as a pool, 
obligations for compensation could be passed to the owner of the 
system where the owner is strictly liable for the harm of the AI 
system.72 Similarly, an AI system could be treated as an employee and 
the owner as an employer. In this instance, the owner may be required 
to ensure some adequate level of supervision.73  
The question of legal identity is not straightforward and will likely 
be complicated by the nuances of specific technologies. The only 
certainty in this realm is that shifts to greater autonomy in AI will 
continue to drive a need to, at the very least, reassess the capacity of 
traditional liability regimes to provide just compensation for those 
harmed. Until technology forces the judiciary to adopt new frameworks 
of legal identity for AI systems, it is likely that litigation will be driven 
by the view that principals, such as developers, manufacturers, and 
owners, are directly responsible for the AI they choose to implement. 
As traditional forms of liability are increasingly tested, new legal 
questions will be raised that will result in justified uncertainty as to how 
adept the judiciary system is to meet the liability challenges brought 
forth by AI. 
B. Applying Traditional Liability Regimes 
With the rise of autonomy in AI systems, the legal community and 
society will be forced to consider novel questions of liability 
surrounding wrongful acts made or influenced by AI. Where a 
sufficient connection is apparent between harm caused by an AI system 
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and the underlying human contribution, legal questions of 
responsibility are more evident. In instances of a programming error or 
identifiable manufacturing defect, fault may be clear. However, as 
technology becomes more complex and convoluted, whether it be more 
lines of code or more entities involved in the production process, 
traditional avenues of assigning responsibility will become less 
apparent. This sub-section explores traditional theories of liability for 
determining fault as applied to the farther end of the AI spectrum -- 
when autonomy is significant, and culpability cannot be easily 
discerned.  
Product liability as a legal framework is perhaps the most 
acceptable form of assigning responsibility for harm arising from AI 
technologies. It typically involves claims surrounding a manufacturing 
defect, design defect, information defect, or a failure to warn. From 
flawed programming to using low quality data during the machine 
learning process to failing to fully warn a consumer of dangerous 
consequences, AI can certainly fall within the purview of product 
liability. However, product liability is premised on the idea that fault is 
discernible. For example, if a plane crashes because of an error in the 
autopilot system, the law will likely hold the developer of the system 
liable either directly or through indemnification. In this instance, the 
legal analysis falls squarely within the realm of product liability in 
some form or another.74 Conversely, it is not to say that this analysis 
would be straightforward. AI technologies are complex, so it is likely 
that litigation may be muddled by a fact-finding process laced with 
finger pointing and compounded questions of blame.  
The courts were recently confronted with an issue that will likely 
challenge AI claims in a similar fashion — whether an auto 
manufacturer can be held liable for a defect when the presence of a 
defect can be inferred, but not identified. In a case involving vehicles 
manufactured by Toyota, a suspected software defect caused a sudden 
acceleration that could not be stopped by the driver.75 In these cases, 
engineers were unable to identify a design or manufacturing flaw that 
caused the sudden acceleration.76 Although the plaintiffs could not 
isolate a specific defect, the court found that there was sufficient 
evidence to which a reasonable jury could infer that the accident was 
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more than likely caused by the car and not the driver.77 Given the 
substantial number of complaints and commonalities among them, 
Toyota has sought to settle cases for economic and personal injury 
claims.78  
The more difficult consideration is whether product liability is 
sufficient to correct harm when it cannot be reasonably inferred that a 
defect contributed to the injury. When an AI machine begins to deviate 
from its programmed priorities, a sign of true autonomy, agency 
principles become less relevant.79 This bares the questions, what is it 
about autonomy that can render it defective within the meaning of the 
law and how do we manage these risks? When there is injury without 
a discernible flaw, defect, or failure arising from human contribution, 
who should bare the loss? Traditional concepts of product liability will 
likely fail to provide relief because a manufacturing defect cannot be 
identified, and the reasonableness of a jury to infer the cause of the 
harm will become increasingly attenuated. 
Absent direct evidence of fault, the law has traditionally looked 
towards the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The idea that the very nature 
of harm infers negligence, however, does not resolve the questions of 
liability for fully autonomous systems. Under res ipsa loquitur, a 
defendant can negate any inference of the necessary elements of duty 
of care, breach, and causation by an evidential showing that the 
defendant’s conduct was not negligent.80 More importantly, this 
doctrine surrounds the inference that someone was a fault. If the harm 
in question is unexplainable, untraceable, and rare, then the elements 
of res ipsa loquitur likely cannot be satisfied. This doctrine may, 
however, survive a determination of fault when an injury is not rare and 
a commonality exists between potential plaintiffs.81 In this instance, 
similar to the Toyota litigation, it may be easier for a jury to infer that 
something must have gone wrong to cause the injuries in question.  
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Some scholars, such as Professor of Law David C. Vladeck, have 
proposed that determining fault must be removed from the equation 
when a failure cannot be reasonably attributed to the product.82 In terms 
of self-driving cars, Professor Vladeck contends that a strict liability 
regime that deviates from standard negligence claims is required 
because the technologically complex nature of these systems can make 
it impossible for an injured party to overcome the traditional defenses 
to negligence.83 This position is also premised on the idea that the 
advanced capacity of these systems is so great that they are not 
expected to fail.84 Where the benefits to society of an autonomous 
technology are so abundant and the risks so rare, a strict liability regime 
may in some cases be sufficient to account for the fringe cases of harm 
caused by an AI system. At the very least, it would likely reduce 
uncertainty in support of innovation.  
Taken a step further, it is possible that a strict liability system 
would have a deterring effect that would serve the goals of an AI-
integrated society when the risk-benefit dichotomy is not so clear. 
Developers and manufacturers of autonomous AI systems would be 
discouraged from taking a product to market that is lacking in effective 
safeguards. While this may stifle innovation in the sense that it would 
slow the pace in which a product reaches consumers, companies 
seeking to reduce uncertainty may be influenced to maximize utility 
and minimize risk before sale. Should science prove correct, driverless 
vehicles will be a prime example where the benefits to society so 
outweigh the risks of rare and unexplainable harms that those in the 
production process can predictably absorb the costs of harm.85 
Similarly, a strict liability regime may indirectly push developers of 
other technologies who seek to capitalize on the economic benefits of 
implementing AI into their industries towards a similar cost-benefit 
scenario that is mutually beneficial for industry and society. 
With strict liability comes the task of appropriating damages, who 
should bear the costs of harm? The most likely entity to be responsible 
would be the manufacturer because the manufacturer is the entity that 
typically controls how, when, and at what cost an AI system enters the 
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market. In doing so, the manufacturer can offset liability costs by 
incorporating some form of an insurance premium into the sale price.86 
However, a narrow view of allocating liability costs to the 
manufacturer can be flawed. AI technologies are complex and likely to 
have many “hands in the pot” as a product goes to market. Given the 
inherent problem of determining fault among the numerous 
programmers and developers, it could very likely be that the 
undeterminable fault lies with one or more entities in the production 
chain. Therefore, it may be more appropriate to spread the costs across 
the companies involved.87 More importantly, placing monetary 
responsibility solely on the manufacturer contrasts with the overall goal 
of public safety. Insulating those that produce a component of an AI 
system may encourage product development that sacrifices the public 
interest for economic benefits beholden only to a single entity.  
In the context addressed so far, strict liability has been considered 
for cases such as self-driving vehicles where the AI technology was 
directly involved in the harm. But it is also necessary to consider how 
allocating costs under a strict liability regime fares when the connection 
between the technology and the victim is separated by some degree. 
This problem can be envisioned by considering the use of AI in 
professional judgment. If an autonomous AI system — one that learns, 
thinks, and acts absent of human control — makes a recommendation, 
and a medical doctor acts based on this information to the detriment of 
a patient, should those in the production chain still bare some cost of 
the injury even if the outcome was highly unanticipated? This scenario 
creates a litany of issues, such as the duty of care a medical provider 
owes to his or her patient when AI technologies are involved in 
treatment.  
This issue will become even more complex when externalities, 
such as insurance coverage, come into play. Can a doctor forego the 
recommended treatment of an AI system in favor of a care that is more 
complimentary to insurance coverage? If the doctor chooses to make 
insurance coverage a priority, are the entities that helped create the 
technology absolved from paying damages even though the 
recommendation of the system was unrealistic given the totality of the 
circumstances. These dilemmas only scratch the surface of legal issues 
that are apt to arise as AI becomes infused into more and more domains. 
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More importantly, they demonstrate how current liability regimes will 
be strained to account for the nuances of AI technologies. While a strict 
liability regime may be a broad solution to the liability of AI systems, 
the law will likely struggle to apply these concepts to AI across the 
board.  
C. The Long-Term Reality: Narrowing the Gap Between Law 
and Technology 
Traditional mechanisms of determining fault and assigning costs 
to compensate those harmed by AI are expected to vex current liability 
regimes as the technology pushes towards fully autonomy. Absent a 
new approach to law and policy, it is unlikely that current liability rules 
will be sufficient to satisfy the expectations of the judiciary and the 
public. With each technology, industry, and application, there will exist 
nuances that cannot be accounted for under common-law tort regimes. 
This problem faced by society, a lack of a uniform solution to the 
liability of AI, will likely require a blended approach that incorporates 
various elements of tort law. AI does not exist in a vacuum, nor will its 
solutions. Society will likely be required to accept remedies that may, 
at times, be laced with conflicting values but are largely beneficial to 
humanity. Liability is just one consideration in the multifaceted world 
of AI and governance. One could argue that AI is so complex that 
specific technologies cannot be effectively governed across the board; 
rather, society’s approach must be geared towards governing specific 
applications and outcomes. Across the world of innovation, the law 
struggles to keep pace. How society narrows the gap, if at all, will 
require legal ingenuity on par with the same technical innovations that 
spawn a new world where the human experience is augmented by 
machines. 
CONCLUSION 
For AI in the law, the challenges are great, the scope is vast, and 
the implications are significant. In the realm of imagination, AI is a 
spectrum of utility ranging from mundane tasks to the ability to think, 
learn, and act in a manner more intelligent than humans. Although AI 
technology stands in a relative infant state, scientific breakthroughs are 
rapidly shifting specific applications of AI from a conceptual dream to 
a tangible reality. With each concrete realization, the debate over the 
utility of AI is invigorated with questions of law and social policy. As 
with other emerging technologies, AI will continue to push for new 
approaches in law and policy as it stands to disrupt normal notions of 
governance. In the near-term, AI technologies will likely elude 
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regulatory efforts and instead be subject to case-by-case determinations 
of liability in civil courts. However, as the technology moves towards 
greater autonomy, it will become increasingly more difficult to 
harmonize the nuances of innovation with traditional concepts of law. 
Moving forward, to capitalize on the benefits offered by AI, or more 
importantly to avoid its destructive perils, it will be paramount for 
society and the law to evolve.  
 
 
